The Quest for Correctness -Beyond Verification

Joseph Sifakis VERIMAG Laboratory Turing Lecture Embedded Systems Week 2008 Atlanta, October 20, 2008

Correctness by checking vs. Correctness by construction

Building systems which are <u>correct with respect to given</u> <u>requirements</u> is the main challenge for all engineering disciplines

Correctness can be achieved:

- Either <u>by checking</u> that a system or a model of a system meets given requirements
- Or <u>by construction</u> by using results such as algorithms, protocols, architectures e.g. token ring protocol, time triggered architecture


A big difference between Computing Systems Engineering and disciplines based on Physics is the importance of *a posteriori* verification for achieving correctness

Current status

Work directions

Conclusion

Approaches for checking correctness



Verification: Three essential ingredients

Requirements

describing the expected behavior, usually as a set of properties

Models

describing a transition relation on the system states


Methods

for checking that the models satisfy the requirements

Requirements specification (1/3)

State-based

Using a machine (monitor) to specify observable behavior



Good for characterizing causal dependencies e.g. sequences of actions

Property-based

Using formulas, in particular *temporal logic*, to characterize a set of execution structures e.g. traces, execution trees

always(inev (enable(send)))

always(inev (enable(receive)))

Good for expressing global properties such as mutual exclusion, termination, fairness

Requirements specification (2/3)

About Temporal logic [Pnueli, Lamport, Clarke & Emerson]


This was a breakthrough in understanding and formalizing requirements for concurrent systems. Writing rigorous specifications in temporal logic is not trivial.

- There exist subtle differences in the formulation of common concepts such as liveness and fairness depending on the underlying time model e.g. always(inevitable(f))
- The declarative and dense style in the expression of propertybased requirements is not always easy to master and understand. Are specifications
 - □ **Sound**: there exists a model satisfying it
 - □ **Complete**: tight characterization of system behavior

Pragmatically, we need a combination of both property-based and state-based styles, e.g. PSL

Requirements specification (3/3)

Moving towards a "less declarative" style by using notations such as MSC's or interface automata



Much to be done for extra-functional requirements characterizing:


- security (e.g. privacy properties),
- reconfigurability (e.g. non interference of features),
- quality of service (e.g. jitter).

Building models (1/3)

Models should be:


- faithful e.g. whatever property we verify for the model holds for the real system
- generated automatically from system descriptions

For hardware, it is easy to get faithful logical finite state models represented as systems of boolean equations



Building models (2/3)


For software this may be much harder



Building models (3/3)

For mixed Software / Hardware systems:


- there are no faithful modeling techniques as we have a poor understanding of how software and the underlying platform interact
- validation by testing physical prototypes or by simulation of ad hoc models



Algorithmic Verification: Using Abstraction (1/2)

 S_A satisfies f_A implies S satisfies f where $S_A = (Q_A, R_A)$ is an **abstraction** of S = (Q, R)for formulas f involving only universal quantification over execution paths

[Cousot&Cousot 79] **Abstract interpretation**, a general framework for computing abstractions based on the use of Galois connections



 $\alpha F \gamma$ is the best approximation of F in the abstract state space

Algorithmic Verification: Using Abstraction (2/2)

Model checking

- Initially, focused on finite state systems (hardware, control intensive reactive systems)
 Later, it addressed verification of infinite state systems by using abstractions
- Used to check general properties specified by temporal logics

Abstract interpretation

- Driven by the concern for finding adequate abstract domains for efficient verification of program properties, in particular runtime errors
- Focuses on forward or backward reachability analysis for specific abstract domains

Significant results can still be obtained by combining these two approaches e.g. by using libraries of abstract domains in model checking algorithms.

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O V E R V I E W

Work directions: Component-based modeling


Develop theory and methods for building faithful models for mixed SW/HW systems as the composition of heterogeneous components



Sources of heterogeneity

- Abstraction levels: hardware, execution platform, application software
- Execution: synchronous and asynchronous components
- Interaction: function call, broadcast, shared memory, message passing etc.

We need to move



Work directions: Compositional verification

Proving properties of a composite component from properties of

- individual components
- its architecture



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We need to move

	Composition operation	Properties			
from	Automata-based	Safety, liveness			
to	Component-based	Specific properties e.g. Deadlock-freedom, mutex			

Develop compositionality results


- For particular
 - □ architectures (e.g. client-server, star-like, time triggered)
 - □ programming models (e.g. synchronous, data-flow)
 - execution models (e.g. event triggered preemptable tasks)
- For specific classes of properties such as deadlock-freedom, mutual exclusion, timeliness

Compositionality rules and combinations of them lead


- to "verifiability" conditions, that is conditions under which verification of a particular property becomes much easier.
- to classes of systems which are correct-by-construction

Work directions: Compositionality - example

Checking <u>global deadlock-freedom</u> of a system built from deadlock-free components, by separately analyzing the components and the architecture.



Potential deadlock $D = en(p1) \land \neg en(p2) \land$ $en(q2) \land \neg en(q1)$



Potential deadlock $D = en(p1) \land \neg en(p2) \land$ $en(q2) \land \neg en(q3) \land$ $en(r3) \land \neg en(r1)$

Work directions: Compositionality - example

Eliminate potential deadlocks D by computing compositionally global invariants I such that IAD=false

Example	Number of Comp	Number of Ctrl States	Number of Bool Variable s	Numb of Int Var	Number Potential Deadlocks	Number Remaining Deadlocks	Verification Time
Temperature Control (2 rods)	3	6	0	3	8	3	3s
Temperature Control (4 rods)	5	10	0	5	32	15	6s
UTOPAR (40 cars,256 CU)	297	795	40	242	??	0	3m46s
UTOPAR (60 cars, 625 CU)	686	1673	60	362	??	0	25m29s
R/W (2000 readers)	2002	4006	0	1	??	0	4m46s
R/W (3000 readers)	3002	6006	0	1	??	0	10m9s

Results obtained by using the D-Finder tool: http://www-verimag.imag.fr/~thnguyen/tool/

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From a posteriori verification to

constructivity at design time

A posteriori verification is not the only way for guaranteeing correctness.

- In contrast to Physics, Computer Science deals with a potentially infinite number of created universes
- Limiting the focus on particular tractable universes of systems can help overcome current limitations

We should concentrate on compositional modeling and verification for sub-classes of systems and properties which are operationally relevant and technically successful

This vision can contribute to the unification of the discipline, by bridging the gap between Formal Methods and Verification, and Algorithms and Complexity.

Thank You